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1 Introduction 
The rapid and ongoing process of digitalization has given rise to a new industry – the digital 
economy. Despite the innovative character of most digital business models and their positive 
contribution to economic growth, digital firms have been repeatedly subject to an intensive 
public and political debate on their tax avoidance activities.1 The dependence on physical 
presence for the establishment of a taxable nexus, which is a main feature of the existing, 
ancient tax framework, poses a great challenge for the taxation of cross-border transactions of 
digital businesses. In recent years, policymakers and academics across the globe have 
developed reform proposals to address the tax challenges of the digital economy (Andersson, 
2017; Brauner and Pistone, 2018; Devereux and Vella, 2018; OECD, 2018, 2019; Schön, 2018).  
In March 2018, the European Commission published a “digital tax package” containing 
two drafts for council directives presenting tax measures directly targeting digital corporations 
(European Commission, 2018a). The first draft suggests the introduction of a Digital Services 
Tax (DST) as interim solution, focusing on revenues from digital services of large corporations. 
The share of digital revenues that is generated in the European Union (EU) shall be taxed with 
a flat tax rate of three percent. The second draft aims for a comprehensive solution in the long 
run. A Significant Digital Presence shall establish a new taxable nexus within the current 
permanent establishment concept (“virtual permanent establishment”). Despite the importance 
of understanding the economic effects of such tax changes, no previous study explores the 
impact of digital taxation on firms. In this study, we fill this gap in the literature.  
                                                 
1 The effective tax rate of big tech companies is regularly discussed in the public media and Margarethe Vestager, 
European Commissioner for Competition, has become publicly known for her focus on illegal state aid cases and 
tax affair investigations. See for example, https://www.ft.com/content/79b56392-dde5-11e8-8f50-cbae5495d92b; 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/oct/08/facebook-uk-tax-bill-sales-margaret-hodge and 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-09-16/apple-takes-on-eu-s-vestager-in-record-14-billion-tax-
battle 
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Since firm-specific costs and benefits will ultimately be reflected in a change in firm 
value, we focus on the impact of the draft directives on firm value. Generally, the observable 
change in firm value is a combination of investors’ expectations of the effects of the proposed 
measures on a firm’s future profitability and the ex-ante probability of enactment. Investors’ 
expectations of the potential effects of the proposals may be manifold. First, additional 
corporate taxes decrease a firm’s expected after-tax cash flow, thereby reducing investment 
opportunities and growth potential (Doidge and Dyck, 2015; Wagner et al., 2018a). Second, 
investors may evaluate that the conceptions of the draft directives, including arbitrarily chosen 
size thresholds, cause the discrimination of certain digital firms and lead to a distortion of 
competition. Third, the newly proposed measures – envisaged as an addition to the existing tax 
framework – lead to enhanced reporting complexity as well as legal uncertainty and increase 
the risk of corporate double taxation. Finally, investors may also consider the uniqueness of the 
proposed measures and perceive the specific targeting of a supranational institution on the 
digital economy as a threat to future profitability. At the time of the draft directive release, it 
was seen as very likely that new measures would become effective. Pierre Moscovici, 
Commissioner of Taxation, stated: “Digital taxation is no longer a question of ‘if’ – this ship 
has sailed” (European Commission, 2018b). Overall, we expect to observe a negative capital 
market reaction in response to the digital tax proposals. 
We employ a short-term event study design to measure investor reaction. In line with 
Gaertner et al. (2019), we apply a Google Trends analysis and find heightened attention towards 
the EU digital tax proposals on March 21, 2018, the day of the detailed and official 
communication of the new draft directives, and on the subsequent day. Hence, we use a two-
day event window to examine the short-term stock market reaction for 222 potentially affected 
digital corporations. Our sample is selected in a similar vein as the samples used to estimate the 
  
3 
 
additional tax revenues to be generated through a DST (European Commission, 2018c; Fuest 
et al., 2018).  
We find a significant negative capital market reaction in response to the release of the 
draft directives. The cumulative average abnormal return over a two-day window starting at the 
event day and ending on the day with the highest public attention is negative 0.692 percent. 
This suggests that investors, on average, perceive the introduction of digital tax measures as 
both a likely event and negative news for firms’ profitability. The observed significant wealth 
reduction of shareholders may be translated into reduced opportunities for affected firms to 
invest and grow in the future. 
Furthermore, we analyze the cross-sectional variation in market reaction. The negative 
abnormal return is significantly stronger for firms that are more aggressively avoiding taxes 
and for firms that have higher profit shifting potential. This suggests that (some) digital firms 
are currently able to avoid taxation in the EU, but that investors believe that this opportunity 
would vanish through the introduction of the digital tax package. Thus, the proposed digital tax 
may be an effective measure to prevent base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS). In line with 
our expectations, we further find that the stock market reaction is more severe for firms with 
higher exposure to the EU and for firms with higher revenues. 
Next, we translate the cumulative average abnormal return drop into absolute terms. In 
line with Cline et al. (2018), we calculate the change in market value based on firm-specific 
abnormal returns. The total abnormal market value change is estimated to be economically 
meaningful by at least minus 52 billion euro over the two-day event window. Thereof, about 
40 percent is attributable to firms located in the U.S., supporting the argument that a DST will 
mainly affect large U.S. firms and justifying the concern of increased political and economic 
costs due to potential U.S. countermeasures. 
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Our analysis adds to the recent call in the literature for further empirical research on the 
proposed measures of taxing the digital economy and the adaption of the international tax 
framework to the digital era (Devereux and Vella, 2018; Olbert and Spengel, 2019). While prior 
studies have mostly focused on a technical evaluation of the DST and virtual permanent 
establishment concept (e.g., Nieminen, 2018; Becker and Englisch, 2018), the literature is 
largely silent about the real effects of such measures on firms. Such an evaluation, however, is 
especially important against the background of ongoing tax discussions at the level of the 
OECD and unilateral actions of several jurisdictions to introduce a DST. Our results indicate 
that policymakers should proceed with caution before imprudently introducing digital tax 
measures. The economic effects of reduced investments and growth of digital companies may 
outweigh potential benefits.  
Furthermore, our study contributes to the literature concerned with the effect of tax 
reforms on shareholder value. Previous literature has predominately focused on non-European 
events when assessing the capital market reaction around major tax reforms and reform 
proposals. Doidge and Dyke (2015) show, amongst others, that additional corporate taxes imply 
a negative effect on firm value. Several scholars analyze the stock market reactions in response 
to the recent U.S. tax reforms and find heterogeneous stock price reactions across firms and 
countries (Gaertner et al., 2019; Overesch and Pflitsch, 2019; Wagner et al., 2018a, 2018b). 
Hoopes et al. (2016) analyze the events around the U.S. sales tax reform for online retail 
companies. The study provides evidence of negative abnormal returns for targeted online 
retailers. A different line of literature has found inconclusive results on investor reaction to the 
introduction of mandatory tax disclosure rules in Europe and Australia (Chen, 2017; Dutt et al., 
2019; Hoopes et al., 2018; Johannesen and Larsen, 2016). To the best of our knowledge, we are 
the first to examine the stock market reaction in response to the European Commission’s draft 
directives on a tax reform for digital corporations.  
  
5 
 
Finally, this paper contributes to the literature that examines the effectiveness of anti-tax 
avoidance policies and BEPS countermeasures. One strand of the literature focuses on the 
effects of countermeasure on firm behavior and finds that increased transfer pricing 
documentation regulation and controlled foreign corporation legislation mitigate the 
possibilities to relocate income (Beer and Loeprick, 2015; Buettner and Wamser, 2013). An 
alternative strand of the literature shows that a variety of factors such as public scrutiny, 
executive characteristics, firm’s ownership structure or the capital structure of firms affect the 
tax avoidance behavior of multinational corporations (Armstrong et al., 2012; Blouin et al., 
2014; Dyreng et al., 2016). Yet, to the best of our knowledge, only Blouin et al. (2014) analyze 
the effects of countermeasures on tax avoidance and firm value. Our results indicate that the 
draft directives effectively target firms with higher tax avoidance activities and higher profit 
shifting potential. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Chapter two provides an overview of 
the proposed digital tax initiatives and derives the hypotheses. The third chapter highlights our 
data sources and the methodological approach. The main results are depicted in chapter four. 
Furthermore, we provide heterogeneity analyses, economic implications and additional 
robustness tests in the fourth chapter. Finally, chapter five concludes. 
2 Institutional Background and Hypotheses Development 
2.1 The Digital Tax Initiatives in the European Union 
In response to the challenges that the ongoing digitalization poses on the well-functioning of 
the international tax framework, various policymakers currently develop and discuss potential 
measures to adapt the international tax system.2 The European Commission published a “digital 
tax package” on March 21, 2018 containing two drafts for council directives that are concerned 
                                                 
2 The OECD member states are currently proceeding an initiative to address the tax challenges of the digitalization 
of the economy. In its most recent public consultation document, the OECD proposes a corporate tax reform that 
intends to shift taxing rights to the market jurisdiction and picks up the concept of a Significant Digital Presence. 
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with the taxation of digital activities and services (European Commission, 2018a, 2018d, 
2018e). The first draft aims to introduce a new EU-wide system of a turnover tax on certain 
digital services as an interim solution. The second draft focuses on a long-term solution, 
presenting rules and provisions for the corporate taxation of a Significant Digital Presence (e.g., 
Nieminen, 2018; Olbert and Spengel, 2019; Petruzzi & Koukoulioti, 2018; Sheppard, 2018). 
The DST, proposed in the first draft directive, shall constitute a gross revenue tax of three 
percent. Taxable shall be those revenues that result from the provision of three types of digital 
services (European Commission, 2018e). First, the placement of advertising on digital 
interfaces targeted on users of that interface, second the provision of digital interfaces to users, 
which allow users to find each other, to interact and to exchange goods and services, and third 
the transmission of user data generated from users’ activities on digital interfaces.  
The proposal further suggests that for the purpose of the DST, only those entities shall 
qualify as a taxable person that exceed two size thresholds. The consolidated amount of 
worldwide company turnover must exceed 750 million euro within a financial year and the total 
amount of taxable revenues within the EU – those revenues that are taxable under the scope of 
the DST – must exceed 50 million euro in the same financial year (European Commission, 
2018e).  
The second draft directive of the European Commission aims for a comprehensive 
solution in the long run and intends to establish a new taxable nexus for firms that maintain a 
non-physical but Significant Digital Presence in one or more member states of the EU. Using a 
Significant Digital Presence as taxable nexus extends the existing physical permanent 
establishment concept by the concept of a virtual permanent establishment. According to the 
draft directive, a Significant Digital Presence exists in a member state if digital services are 
supplied through a digital interface and one or more of the following thresholds of digital 
activity are met in a member state in the tax period by an entity itself or together with its 
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associated enterprises. First, revenues from supplying digital services to users exceed 7 million 
euro, second, the number of users of digital services supplied exceeds 100,000 or third, the 
number of business contracts concluded for the supply of digital services exceeds 3,000. With 
regard to profit allocation, the European Commission recommends the application of the profit 
split method as the most appropriate method (European Commission, 2018d; Olbert and 
Spengel, 2019; Sheppard, 2018).  
Despite the European Commission’s effort to gain political agreement on the DST 
proposal as a “quick fix” for the international tax framework, member states could not reach a 
common agreement on the draft directives.3 Yet, the Vice-President of the European 
Commission recommended member states to use the DST proposal as a framework for 
legislative actions at the national level.4 As depicted in Table 1, several countries have followed 
this recommendation and started to introduce a DST at the unilateral level. The political and 
academic debate on digital tax measures is ongoing and empirical insights on the economic 
effects of such measures are highly valuable.5   
2.2 Implications of the Digital Tax Package and Hypotheses 
It is widely accepted that tax policy changes may have large impacts on stock prices and that it 
is important to have an awareness of the potential effects implied (Doidge and Dyck, 2015; 
Downs and Tehranian, 1988). In general, stock prices are related to the cash flow distributions 
expected to be generated by the firm and incorporate all information that is available to the 
market (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). Therefore, ceteris paribus and abstracting from 
potential tax shields, additional corporate taxes payable intuitively have a negative influence on 
                                                 
3 See for main results of the ECOFIN meetings on December 04, 2018 and  March 12, 2019, 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/ecofin/2018/12/04/ and https://www.consilium.europa.eu 
/en/meetings/ecofin/2019/03/12/. 
4 See Debate in the European Parliament on April, 15 2019: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-
8-2019-04-15-ITM-021_EN.html?redirect. 
5 The European Commissioner-designate for the economy said that he is not willing to wait on a tax for digital 
corporations (https://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/nahaufnahme-herr-gentiloni-und-das-geld-1.4613866).  
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the stock price of a firm as they constitute additional cash outflows, reducing the after-tax cash 
flow (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980; Doidge and Dyck, 2015; Wagner et al., 2018a). 
Furthermore, also the conception of the proposed digital tax measures may impact 
shareholder value. Both academics and practitioners immediately and heavily criticized the 
digital tax proposals for being populistic and shortsighted (e.g., Fuest et al., 2018; Næss-
Schmidt et al., 2018; Spengel, 2018). In particular, the proposal of a DST deviates from the 
conceptual fundamentals of the existing tax framework of corporate profit taxation. An 
introduction in addition to the existing system is likely to create a complex and discriminating 
tax system that distorts competition and harms the position of EU member states in terms of 
international tax competition (CFE Fiscal Committee, 2018; Petruzzi and Koukoulioti, 2018; 
Sheppard, 2018; van Horzen and van Esdonk, 2018; Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim 
Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2018).  
In general, a tax on gross revenues has a stronger effect on the after-tax cash flow than a 
corporate net profit tax and may cause serious consequences for affected firms in terms of 
competitiveness and discrimination (Fuest et al., 2018; Nieminen, 2018; Spengel, 2018). This 
distress is exacerbated by the inverse proportionality between corporate profitability and the 
effective tax burden. Furthermore, the proposed method for the relief of double taxation – the 
possibility to deduct the DST paid from the corporate income tax base – does not eliminate but 
only mitigate double taxation (European Commission, 2018e). Fuest et al. (2018) point out that 
the fixed thresholds lead to the undesirable effect that around the limit value additional gross 
income reduces the net income of a taxable entity. In the same vein, distortion of competition 
is conceivable, as one competitor, slightly above a threshold, would have to pay the tax, while 
another competitor, slightly below the relevant threshold, would be tax exempt (Nieminen, 
2018). As a consequence, large digital firms are ring-fenced, even though several scholars have 
shown the impracticability and distortive effect of such practice (Olbert and Spengel, 2019; 
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Schön, 2018). Simultaneously, the broadly defined digital service revenue categories increase 
the risk that the scope of the proposed digital tax measures is overshooting.6  
In addition, the newly proposed measures introduce considerable tax uncertainty for 
affected corporations. Hanlon et al. (2017) have shown that increasing tax uncertainty is 
positively associated with costly cash holdings. Furthermore, it is argued that large cash 
holdings reduce the return on investment and the market misprices it (Dechow et al., 2008; 
Hanlon et al., 2017). 
Based on the findings in prior literature and our assessment of the European 
Commissions’ draft directives, we expect a mean negative investor reaction in response to the 
communication of the European Commission and large media attention on March 21, 2018. 
H1: The abnormal stock price reaction for affected firms is negative in our two-day event 
window starting on March 21, 2018. 
In addition, the digital tax proposals are motivated by the widespread political perception 
that digital firms pay fewer taxes (European Commission, 2018d; OECD, 2015). In fact, the 
newly proposed measures have the design of countermeasures to prevent base erosion and profit 
shifting in the European Union. Hence, we expect that firms that engage more aggressively in 
tax avoidance and firms with more profit shifting potential are affected to a greater extent by 
the draft directives.  
H2: The negative stock market reaction is more pronounced for digital firms that are 
more aggressively reducing their tax burden or have more profit shifting potential. 
Moreover, the proposed DST shall tax certain digital revenues that are generated in the 
EU with a flat tax rate of three percent. As the concrete amount of such taxable revenues is 
                                                 
6 Traditionally non-digital corporations such as the New York Times or the German publishing company Springer, 
which have a growing online business model, would be subject to the new draft directives. 
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hardly observable, investors may consider the overall engagement in the European market as a 
proxy to evaluate whether a firm is affected. Hence, we expect that the stock market reaction is 
more negative for firms with higher exposure to the European market. Since the tax burden of 
the DST is proportional to revenues rather than profits, we further expect that the capital market 
reaction is in absolute terms larger for firms with higher revenues and for loss-making firms 
that might not have the necessary funds to finance the additional taxes on gross revenues. 
H3: The negative stock market reaction is more pronounced for digital firms that are 
more engaged in the European market, larger digital firms and digital firms in a state of loss.  
Finally, we expect that comparable digital firms that are not affected by the draft 
directives, i.e., that have revenues below the specified threshold of 750 million euro, do not 
experience a negative abnormal market return on our event date. Firms above the revenues 
threshold are expected to react negatively, in comparison. 
H4: The stock market reaction for digital firms above the proposed revenue threshold is 
negative in comparison to similar digital firms below the revenue threshold.  
3 Data and Research Design 
We conduct an event study to estimate the effect of the proposed “digital tax package” on the 
stock returns of affected firms (Chen, 2017; Eckbo et al., 2007; Frischmann et al., 2008; 
Thompson, 1985). The event study methodology measures the magnitude of the effect an event 
has on the expected profitability. In other words, it provides a measure of the impact of that 
event on the value of a firm and the wealth of investors (Agrawal and Kamakura, 1995; Kothari 
and Warner, 2007). 
On March 21, the European Commission released two drafts for council directives that 
contained details on the specific design of the digital tax measures and on the characteristics of 
affected firms. We assume that market participants have not been aware of – or anticipated – 
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the detailed content of the digital tax package before its release and have just then started to 
process and incorporate the relevant information into stock prices. In line with prior studies, we 
conduct a Google Trends analysis to capture the event date that is most likely to be relevant for 
the stock price effect (Gaertner et al., 2019). Google Trends provides the frequency of search 
requests on a specified topic of interest over a time horizon as an index value.7 Figure 1 depicts 
the Google Trends analysis. We can see a large spike on March 21, 2018, which corresponds 
to the date the European Commission released the proposals accompanied by a major press 
release. The interest in the EU Digital Tax proposal reached an even higher level on March 22, 
2018. Hence, we include both days in our event window.  
We select treated firms based on the characteristics outlined in the draft directives. Table 
2 depicts our sample selection procedure. We use data from the Bureau van Dijk ORBIS 
database to identify all publicly listed corporations with consolidated worldwide turnover above 
750 million euro in the last financial year known at the time of the proposal. In line with the 
study of Fuest et al. (2018), we restrict the sample to firms active in industries that are likely to 
fall in the scope of the “digital tax package”.8 Based on this classification, we end up with 192 
potentially affected corporations. Furthermore, accompanying the proposals, the European 
Commission released an Impact Assessment of the draft directives, wherein they explicitly refer 
to 112 top digital corporations that are assumed to be affected by the measures (European 
Commission, 2018c; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2017). We 
manually add all named firms that are not yet captured by the industry classification to our 
sample. 
                                                 
7 We searched for several terms that could relate to the EU digital tax proposals such as: “Digital Tax“, 
“Commission Proposal“, “Digital services Tax“, “Digital Permanent Establishment” “Significant Digital 
Presence” and all results lead to similar patterns around the release of the directive proposals. Our main 
specification relies on the most commonly used term to describe both proposals: EU Digital Tax.  
8 The relevant NACE Rev. 2 codes are: 6201, 6209, 6311, 6312, 4791 and 5811 to 5819. 
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We obtain one year of daily stock market data from the Thomson Reuters EIKON 
database ending ten trading days after our event date. We use the return index (RI) that shows 
the theoretical value of a shareholding, assuming that dividends are reinvested to purchase 
additional shares at the closing price applicable on the ex-dividend date as a base for our daily 
return calculations.9 In line with Frischmann et al. (2008) and Dutt et al. (2019), we drop firms 
without sufficient stock market information and trading activity. Finally, we exclude all 
corporations that held an earnings announcement immediately before, on or after the event date 
to eliminate all stock market reactions not directly linked to the draft directives. Overall, our 
final sample constitutes of 222 corporations, which are listed in Table 3. We show descriptive 
statistics for the sample in Table 4. The average daily return of treated firms is 0.08 percent, 
with a standard deviation of 1.69 percent. The country dispersion of all treated digital 
corporations is depicted in Table 5. 
For our main analysis, we follow the event study design of Thompson (1985) and Eckbo 
et al. (2007). Based on our Google Trends Analysis, our event window covers the day of the 
release of the proposals, March 21st, 2018, and the subsequent day (0 through +1). We set our 
estimation window to contain the trading days -11 through -250 relative to the event day. We 
estimate the following conditional market model:  
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝐷𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡. (1) 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the return of firm i on day t that is likely to fall under the scope of the digital tax 
proposal (group of treated firms). 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the return of the market index m (S&P Global 1200) 
on day t. 𝐷𝑡 is a dummy set equal to one in the two-day event window, and 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is an error term. 
                                                 
9 With 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 as share price of firm 𝑖 on day 𝑡, 𝑅𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 ×
𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
 . Except when 𝑡 equals the ex-dividend-date, 
then: 𝑅𝐼𝑡 = 𝑅𝐼𝑡−1 ×
𝑃𝑡 + 𝐷𝑡
𝑃𝑡−1
 with 𝐷𝑡  being the dividend payment associated with the ex-date. Based on this price 
information, daily (total) returns (𝑅𝑖,𝑡) are calculated. Daily returns are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent level, 
which amount to -5.136 percent and 5.618 percent, respectively. We acknowledge the view that winsorizing of 
return data may distort the “true“ market movement. Hence, we rerun the analysis with non-winsorized return data 
confirming our results. The results can be found in Appendix Table 17. 
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𝛼𝑖 provides an estimate for the alpha of an equally-weighted portfolio of all 222 treated firms 
and 𝛽𝑖 is the estimate of the portfolio’s market beta. The coefficient estimate of 𝛾𝑖 provides an 
estimate for the average abnormal return during the event window. The coefficient of interest 
has to be multiplied by the number of days in the event window to get an estimate for the 
cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) (Doidge and Dyck, 2015; Eckbo et al., 2007). In 
line with our two-day event window, we double the coefficient estimate.  
For our cross-sectional analyses (H2-H4), we include a parameter to account for a firm’s 
level of tax aggressiveness, profit shifting potential or other firm-specific characteristics, which 
we obtain from the ORBIS database. The conditional market model expands as follows: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝐷𝑡 + 𝜌𝑖𝐼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑖𝐼𝑖𝐷𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡.  (2) 
The variables are defined as before and  𝐼𝑖 is an indicator for firm-specific characteristics. The 
estimate of the interaction coefficient, 𝛿𝑖, becomes the coefficient of interest.  
4 Results 
4.1 Main Results 
The baseline results of the event study are presented in Table 6. In the event period of interest, 
covering the event day – the day of the release of the digital tax proposals – and the day after, 
we find a mean negative cumulative average abnormal return of -0.692 percent, which is 
significant at the one percent level. The regression results further indicate that the portfolio of 
222 treated firms has a market beta of 0.676 and a significant alpha of 0.047 percent.  
Overall, the analysis provides significant statistical evidence of a mean negative stock 
price reaction of affected firms to the EU digital tax proposals and confirms our first hypothesis. 
Assuming efficiency of capital markets, this mean negative change in firm values around the 
event date represents both the expected costs and profits of the event as well as the ex-ante 
probability that the event occurs, i.e., the net present value that is associated with the draft 
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directives (Johannesen and Larsen, 2016; Wagner et al., 2018a). Specifically, when analyzing 
the impact of additional taxes on the value of a stock, what matters to investors is the potential 
additional amount in taxes that the firm will be liable to pay in the future (Wagner et al., 2018a). 
Hence, these results are consistent with investors anticipating that the introduction of the digital 
tax package negatively affects digital firms’ future profitability. Figure 2 shows the buy and 
hold return of an equally-weighted portfolio of all potentially affected firms, bought one day 
before the event window. The red line in Figure 2 controls for the market return and depicts the 
abnormal buy and hold return. It becomes evident from this graph that the significant negative 
abnormal return maintains over the subsequent days after the event window. 
In order to further understand investor reactions and test our additional hypotheses, we 
interact our event date dummy with different firm-specific characteristics. First, we include a 
measure of the potential tax aggressiveness of our treated firms. We define the variable Tax 
aggressiveness as the negative of the cash effective tax rate (ETR). Based on the financial 
statements 2017, we calculate the annual ETR for all potentially affected firms. Despite the 
well-known drawbacks of short-term ETR measures, we assume that firms with lower ETRs 
engage more strongly in tax planning and tax avoidance (Dutt et al., 2019; Dyreng et al., 2008). 
In addition, we define the variable Profit shifting potential as the ratio of intangible assets to 
total assets. It has been shown in various studies that intangible assets, and implicitly the level 
of research and development activities, are positively associated with the engagement in profit 
shifting (De Simone et al., 2016; Griffith et al., 2014; Heckemeyer et al., 2014).  
Table 7 depicts the stock market reaction in our event window, controlling for the tax 
aggressiveness of affected firms. As expected, the regression results in column (1) show that 
the capital market reaction is more pronounced for firms that are more tax aggressive. A firm 
with an average ETR of 25.63 percent in our sample has a negative stock market reaction in our 
event window of -0.679 and a one percentage point decrease of the ETR is associated with a 
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0.021 percentage point lower two-day CAAR. Consistently, column (2) highlights that the 
investor reaction for the most tax aggressive firms, those in the lowest ETR quintile, is 
considerably more negative in the event window. Furthermore, stock prices seem to decrease 
more for firms with a higher profit shifting potential, albeit not significant in conventional terms 
(column 3). The last column of Table 7 indicates that the stock market reaction is lower for 
firms with the highest ratio of intangible to total assets (p-value of 0.115). Overall, the results 
are in line with our second hypothesis. These findings further indicate that digital firms are 
currently able to avoid corporate taxates in the EU and that investors believe that the proposed 
measures hamper tax avoidance, increasing affected firms’ tax burden to similar levels as those 
of less-avoiding firms (i.e., considering the DST, all firms pay taxes in proportion to their digital 
revenues in the EU). Consequently, the stock prices of firms that avoid taxes more 
‘aggressively’ and firms with a higher profit shifting potential react stronger to the proposed 
tax measures. 
Next, we test our third hypothesis. Since exact information about the amount and extent 
of firms’ digital activity, digital revenues or number of users in a country is not disclosed 
publically, it is difficult for investors to assess precisely to what extent a firm is affected by the 
digital tax proposals. For this reason, investors may rather evaluate a firm’s engagement in the 
European market. We assume that the level of engagement in the European market is positively 
correlated with the level of revenues that is recognized in the financial statements of European 
affiliates of multinational groups. We define the variable EU exposure as the ratio of revenues 
of EU affiliates to the total revenue of the group’s affiliates. The higher the ratio, the more a 
group is engaged in the European market. Table 8 depicts the results of the regressions that 
include firm-specific interaction variables. Column (1) highlights that a higher EU exposure 
has a significant negative effect on the two-day CAAR. Additionally, the second column of 
Table 8 confirms our prediction of hypothesis three and shows that the group of firms with the 
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highest quintile of EU exposure is affected the most in the event window. This result is in line 
with the scope of the draft directives that are limited to digital services provided in the European 
Union.  
Column (3) of Table 8 indicates that, as intuitively expected, investor reaction is more 
negative for firms with a higher turnover. The capital market seems to have incorporated the 
effects of a flat gross revenue tax that increases the tax burden proportional to the level of 
turnover. The last column of Table 8 indicates that the drop in stock prices is higher for 
corporations that have suffered a loss in the preceding financial year, albeit the interaction 
coefficient is not significant in traditional terms.  
Finally, we check hypothesis four and analyze if comparable firms with revenues below 
the size thresholds - thus not affected by the EU directive proposals - react significantly different 
than the firms in our treated sample. We limit our sample of comparable digital corporations to 
listed firms in the same industries as the firms in our treatment sample and delete all firms with 
annual consolidated revenues below 200 million euro. By doing so, we prevent to compare 
large digital corporations with very small and potentially structurally different firms. Our 
sample of control firms includes 123 firms. Table 9 depicts the results of a difference in 
differences regression that is similar to equation (2) with the indicator 𝐼𝑖 being a dummy 
variable with the value of one for firms above the size threshold of 750 million euro. The 
negative and significant interaction coefficient provides an estimate for the difference in CAAR 
between the two groups. The abnormal return over the two event days seems to be by about 1 
percentage point lower for affected firms above the size threshold.  
Overall and in line with the assumption of efficient markets, the findings imply that 
investors, when evaluating the effect of the digital tax package, take not only into account 
whether a firm is purely affected, but also weigh the impact depending on a firm’s 
characteristics.  
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4.2 Economic Magnitude 
Based on our findings of a negative capital market reaction, we estimate the reduction of market 
value in absolute terms. Table 10 depicts the absolute abnormal market value change. Market 
values are obtained from the EIKON database and converted into euro using the applicable 
exchange rate on our event date. The total market value of all 222 affected firms is more than 
4 trillion euro.10 We estimate the firm-specific change in abnormal market value as the product 
of a firm’s market value and its abnormal return in our two-day event window (Cline et al., 
2018; Malatesta, 1983; Peterson, 1989).11 The overall abnormal market value change is the sum 
of all affected firms’ abnormal market value changes. We find that the market value of firms 
that are likely to be affected by the EU digital tax proposals dropped by at least 52 billion euro 
in excess of the normal market movement. A considerable share of the abnormal market value 
change is born by U.S. based corporations, which constitute the largest group of treated firms. 
About 40% of the market value reduction is attributable to firms headquartered in the U.S.  
These results suggest that investors have noticed the ring-fencing and unavoidable nature 
of the European Commission’s draft directives and anticipate a considerable increase in tax 
burden for digital firms. Up to now, investor perceptions and the magnitude of firm value 
reduction have not been part of the debate on the suitability of the draft directives. 
In a back-of-the-envelope comparison, we relate the magnitude of our result to the 
findings in prior studies. Doidge and Dyck (2015) analyze the surprising proposition of a 
corporate tax on a group of previously untaxed Canadian publicly traded firms. The authors 
find that the additional tax of 31.5 percent on net profits was associated with a drop in firm 
value of about 17.5 percent (an elasticity of -0.56). If we attribute the stock market reaction in 
                                                 
10 Based on our average abnormal return estimates during the two-day event window, we find an abnormal change 
in market value of 28,805 million euro. This estimate is our lowest bound for the abnormal change in market value. 
11 ∆𝑀𝑉 = ∑ ∑ 𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡
1
𝑡=0 × 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1
222
𝑖=1 , where 𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 refers to the closing market value of firm 𝑖 at trading day 𝑡. AR 
denotes to the abnormal return. 𝑡 = 0 refers to March 20, 2018. The AR is estimated using the Market Model 
approach, see Table 12. 
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our event window purely to the more precisely outlined DST of three percent on gross revenues, 
our results indicate that the magnitude of capital market reaction is slightly lower per percentage 
point (-0.231 percent per percentage point). This lower effect of our estimates might result from 
the higher implementation likelihood of the unilaterally proposed additional corporate tax rate 
in Canada, compared to the – multilateral approval requiring – European Commission’s 
directive proposals. Additionally, Overesch and Pflitsch (2019) and Gaertner et al. (2019) 
analyze firm value changes in response to the U.S. tax reform. The effect size of their estimated 
capital market reaction ranges between 0.45 percent and 0.6 percent, which is – in absolute 
terms – slightly higher than our estimates on the capital market reaction in response to the 
release of the directive proposals. Finally, Hoopes et al. (2016) investigate the stock market 
reaction to the legislative process of making online retailers subject to sales taxes in the U.S. In 
this setting, which targets digital corporations and may be considered the most comparable to 
our study in prior literature, the authors find a negative cumulative abnormal return of -0.43 
percent, pooling their event dates. Despite the conceivability that the draft directives might have 
a more severe negative impact on the profitability of digital firms than the introduction of sales 
tax on e-commerce in the U.S., our estimated capital market reaction is lower than their effect.  
4.3 Robustness Tests 
 We conduct a number of robustness tests to verify our main results. First, in Table 11, 
we replicate our main analysis for four alternative event dates to mitigate concerns that the 
event has materialized at a different point in time.12 None of the prior leaked information about 
the new proposals did result in a significant news reaction and the official release of the draft 
                                                 
12 On February, 26 2018 the first rumors on a potential digital tax initiative by the European Commission were 
spread. On March, 15, 2018 occasional reports on the soon to be released directive proposals can be found (Becker 
and Englisch, 2018); https://www.ft.com/content/0c38dd10-2929-11e8-b27e-cc62a39d57a0 (05.08.2019); 
https://www.bloomberg. com/news/articles/2018-03-17/tech-giants-set-to-face-3-tax-on-revenue-under-new-eu-
plan (05.08.2019). At the Economic and Financial Affairs Councils on December, 04, 2018 a strong opposition 
against the council directives was formed and on March, 12 the EU Digital Services Tax proposal was finally taken 
off the agenda in an official debate. 
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directive contained a hitherto not available level of detail. Hence, we are confident that our 
main event date captures the most relevant market reaction to the draft directives. Nevertheless, 
we test the market reaction on the alternative dates. First, for dates before the release of the 
proposals on which rumors about a new European DST spread publicly.  
Second, for dates after the release of the proposals on which it became less likely or 
certain that an EU wide political agreement on the DST will not be reached. In general, all 
results are indistinguishable from zero. Except on March 12, 2019, we find a significant capital 
market reaction over a two-day period. Albeit the date marks the time when it became certain 
that the EU DST is not introduced in the near future in the common market, the abnormal return 
estimates are negative. On the same date, several economy-wide shocks regarding the ongoing 
debate about the exit of Great Britain from the EU have hit the market. The major news could 
confound our estimates on that event date. We cannot fully exclude that the capital market has 
already considered the rumors on the digital tax proposals gradually, but our event study 
analysis of the additional event dates gives us confidence that investors reacted to the digital 
tax package primarily on the date of the official proposal, March 21, 2018. 
Third, we replicate our event study in Table 12 using the method by Kothari and Warner 
(2007) and calculate the cumulative abnormal return for each firm separately. If the expected 
return is based on the market model, as shown in column (1) of Table 12, we find – as expected 
– a comparable and significant CAAR of negative 0.69 percent. In column (2) of Table 12, we 
use the average return of a control group as an estimate for the expected return (Dutt et al., 
2019; Johannesen and Larsen, 2016). The control group consists of comparable digital firms, 
with the same industry classification, that have annual revenues below the size thresholds and 
above 200 million euro. In this specification, we find a significant CAAR of minus 0.986 
percent. 
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Moreover, to check if our results are driven by the choice of an equally-weighted portfolio 
of affected firms, we construct a value-weighted portfolio reflecting the sum of the market 
capitalization of each firm in the sample on each day in the estimation and event window 
(Doidge and Dyck, 2015; Ince and Porter, 2006). In a value-weighted portfolio, firms’ returns 
are weighted according to their relative market value. Thus, the capital market reactions of large 
digital firms such as Amazon or Alphabet have markedly greater effects on the average 
abnormal returns of the portfolio. We rerun the baseline event study regression with value-
weighted returns.  The results are tabulated in Table 13. Again, we find a highly significant 
negative capital market reaction in our event window of -0.59 percent, which is comparable to 
our main specification.  
Fourth, we disentangle the event window and analyze the daily average abnormal returns. 
Table 14 shows the results for our first robustness analysis. The daily abnormal returns range 
between -0.42 and 0.167 percentage and immediately prior to our event window, the direction 
of the abnormal return seems rather inconclusive. To test if the length of our event window 
affects our results, we employ a three-day event window starting on March 20 to capture 
potential stock market movements in anticipation of the draft directives (Austin, 1993; Hanlon 
and Slemrod, 2009). Regression results are displayed in Table 15. Similar to our main 
specification, we find a negative stock market reaction during this three-day event window. 
However, the result is not statistically significant in traditional terms. 
Finally, we employ additional parametric and non-parametric significance tests (Table 
16) to mitigate concerns on the statistical significance of the results of our alternative event 
study method, which is depicted in Table 12. In order to account for potential event day 
clustering, we employ an additional parametric test statistic that uses the variability of the time 
series of the sample’s average abnormal returns in the estimation period (Bernard, 1987; 
Campbell et al., 1997). Furthermore, to ensure that the found significance was not driven by the 
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higher uncertainty in the event period (i.e., greater return variability), we additionally employ 
a non-parametric rank test (Corrado, 1989). The higher uncertainty in the event period 
compared to the estimation period may emerge from the incremental uncertainty incorporated 
into the economic environment by the release of the digital tax package. In contrast to the 
parametric tests, the nonparametric rank test uses ordinal information about the returns. Overall, 
both additional test statistics confirm the significance of the evidence found. Similar to Hoopes 
et al. (2016), we additionally test the frequency of negative abnormal returns in our event 
window for treated and control firms to ensure that our results are not biased by a small number 
of sizeable negative abnormal return outliers (Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009). The results are 
shown in Table 16 Panel B. The test highlights the different capital market reaction between 
treatment and control group and mitigates concerns that the result is driven by one or two large 
stock price decreases (Hoopes et al., 2016). 
5 Conclusion 
In this study, we examine the two draft directives of the European Commission on the taxation 
of the digital economy published on March 21, 2018. The first draft directive suggests the 
introduction of an interim tax of three percent on gross revenues from certain digital services. 
The second draft directive lays down the rules for taxing corporate profits that are attributable 
to a Significant Digital Presence. We employ an event study to analyze the capital market 
reaction to the proposed introduction of the digital tax measures. In our two-day event window 
starting at the day of the release, we find a significant reduction in firm value of 222 digital 
firms which are likely to be affected. We provide evidence that investors believe that the 
proposed digital tax measures will be implemented and have a negative impact on affected 
firms’ future profitability and competitiveness. 
In various cross-sectional analyses, we find that the capital market reaction is, as 
expected, stronger for firms that can be assumed to engage more actively in tax avoidance and 
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have a higher profit shifting potential. Moreover, the capital market reaction is more 
pronounced for firms located in the EU, inversely related to firms’ revenues and seems stronger 
for loss-making firms. Based on our results, we estimate an overall abnormal market value 
decrease of digital and innovative corporations by at least 52 billion euro in response to the 
proposed measures. Thereof about 40% is attributable to U.S. based corporations.  
Overall, we provide evidence that the introduction of ring-fencing digital taxes leads to 
disruptive effects on firm value and, potentially, overall economic wealth. Furthermore, our 
results highlight the distortive nature of the draft directives and substantiate the accusation of 
being focused on U.S. firms. With regard to the identified shortcomings in the conception and 
potentially harmful effects of the draft directives on firms, intergovernmental organizations as 
well as local governments should carefully evaluate the introduction of ring-fencing digital tax 
measures. 
In general, the era of digitalization has led to an intense political and academic debate on 
how to adapt the principles of corporate taxation to changing means of value creation and 
innovative business models. Yet, empirical evidence on the effects of proposed adjustments to 
corporate taxation is scarce. Our findings shall contribute to the recent call in the literature for 
further research on the proposed policies of taxing the digital economy and help to holistically 
evaluate the effects of an introduction of digital tax measures.
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FIGURES 
Figure 1 Google Trends Index for “EU Digital Tax” over the first half of 2018 
Notes: In Figure 1, we plot the Google Trends Index for “EU Digital Tax” over the first six months of 2018 when 
EU policymakers were actively working on the draft tax directives. The Index (y-axis) varies from 0 to 100, where 
100 represents the highest search activity for a specific time period. All other search activities are displayed relative 
to the highest search activity. The local peaks correspond to periods of relatively high search activity regarding 
“EU Digital Tax” and comprise our events of interest. The dots correspond to dates in 2018 and Index values, 
respectively. 
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Figure 2: Buy and hold returns – indexed on March 20, 2018 
 
Notes: The figure displays the buy and hold return and the abnormal buy and hold return of an equally-weighted 
portfolio of all potentially by the draft directives affected firms. The figure is indexed to 100 on March 20, 2018.  
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TABLES 
Table 1 Characteristics of Digital Services Tax proposals 
 
Country Relevant Dates 
  
Characteristics of 
the tax 
Business 
categories  
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EU 21.03.2018 - - 12.03.2019 3% 750 50 x x x 
UK 29.10.2018 12.03.2019 01.04.2020 - 2% 500 25 x x  
France 17.12.2018 24.07.2019 01.01.2019 - 3% 750 25 x x x 
Spain 23.10.2018 18.01.2019 10.01.2019 - 3% 750 3 x x x 
Italy 12.2017 01.01.2019 - - 3% 750 5.5 x x x 
Austria 29.12.2018 04.04.2019 01.01.2020 - 5% 750 25 x   
Czech 
Republic 
30.04.2019 - 01.01.2020 - 7% 750 2 x x x 
Belgium 17.01.2019 - - - 3% 750 50 x x x 
Poland 29.04.2019 - 01.01.2020 - 3% 750 50 x x x 
Notes: The size thresholds are stated in millions of euro. x marks the affected business categories that fall under 
the scope of the Digital Services Tax.  
Sources: EY Tax Alerts; Accountancy Europe available at: https://www.accountancyeurope.eu/wp-
content/uploads/190709-Digital-Tax-fact-sheet_FINAL.pdf (accessed 10.07.2019) and Grant Thornton 
available at:  (https://www.grantthornton.global/en/insights/articles/digital-services-tax-in-europe/ (accessed 
10.07.2019) 
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Table 2 Sample selection procedure 
 
Subsample 1: based on ifo Institute  
Firms identified based on turnover, legal status, NACE codes 194 
Check for consistently assigned firms -1 
Total subsample 1 193 
  
Subsample 2: based on EU Commission  
Top digital MNEs 100 
Check for listed firms and turnover threshold -8 
Total subsample 2 92 
  
Total preliminary combined sample  285 
Overlap of firms in samples  -35 
Required stock price data not available or infrequent trading -22 
Check for potential confounding events (earnings announcement) -6 
Final sample of treated firms 222 
Notes: Turnover refers to the two turnover thresholds incorporated in the Digital Services Tax proposal. 
NACE codes refer to the codes employed by the ifo Institute. The relevant NACE Rev. 2 codes are: 6201, 
6209, 6311, 6312, 4791 and 5811 to 5819. 
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Table 3 List of affected companies 
58.Com Inc. Digital China Holdings Limited Line Corporation Scientific Games Corp 
Activision Blizzard, Inc. Discovery, Inc. Masmovil Ibercom, S.A. Scsk Corporation 
Akamai Technologies INC DUN & Bradstreet Corp. Match Group, Inc. Senshukai CO LTD 
Alibaba Group Holding Limited DXC Technology Company Maxar Technologies Inc. Servicenow, Inc. 
Alliance Data Systems Corp Ebay INC Mediaset S.P.A. Seven West Media Limited 
Allscripts Healthcare Solutions INC Econocom Group SA Meredith Corp SG & G Coporation 
Alphabet Inc. Elanders AB Micro Focus International PLC Shanghai Ganglian E-Commerce 
Holdings Company Limited 
Altran Technologies SA Electronic Arts INC Mixi Inc. SK Holdings Co., Ltd. 
Amadeus IT Group, S.A. Entertainment ONE Limited Modern Times Group AB SKY Limited 
Amazon.Com, Inc. EOH Holdings Limited Moody's Corporation Softbank Group Corp 
AMC Networks Inc. Epam Systems, Inc. Mphasis Limited Solocal Group S.A. 
Amdocs Limited Equifax INC N Brown Group PLC Sonda S.A. 
Anhui Xinhua Media Company 
Limited 
Equinix INC Nasdaq, Inc. Sopra Steria Group 
Arnoldo Mondadori Editore SPA Esprinet S.P.A. Naspers Limited Square Enix Holdings Co., Ltd. 
Asos PLC Expedia Group, Inc. Naver Corporation Super Micro Computer, Inc. 
Asseco Poland S.A. Experian PLC NET ONE Systems CO LTD Sykes Enterprises INC 
Atos SE Facebook, Inc. Netapp, Inc. Synaptics Incorporated 
Autohome Inc. Factset Research Systems INC Netease, Inc. Systemax INC 
Automatic Data Processing INC Fairfax Media Limited Netflix, Inc. T-Gaia Corp. 
Axel Springer SE First Data Corporation Netscout Systems INC Take-Two Interactive Software Inc. 
Baidu Inc. Fiserv INC NEW Media Investment Group Inc. Takkt AG 
Bechtle AG Formula Systems (1985) Limited NEW York Times CO Tata Consultancy Services Limited 
Belluna CO LTD Fuji Soft Inc. News Corporation Tech Mahindra Limited 
Bitauto Holdings LTD Gakken Holdings Co., Ltd. Nexon CO LTD Teradata Corporation 
Booking Holdings Inc. Gannett Co., Inc. Next PLC Thomson Reuters Corporation 
Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc. Gartner INC Nielsen Holdings PLC Transcosmos INC 
Caci International INC Gemalto N.V. Nomura Research Institute, Ltd. Transunion 
Cancom SE Global Payments INC NTT Data Corporation Travelport Worldwide Limited 
Capgemini SE GMO Internet Inc. Otsuka Corporation Trend Micro Incorporated 
CBS Corporation Godaddy Inc. Overstock.Com, Inc. Trivago N.V. 
CDW Corp Graham Holdings Company Paypal Holdings, Inc. Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. 
Cerner Corp Groupon, Inc. PC Connection INC Twitter, Inc. 
Check Point Software Technologies 
Limited 
Grupo Televisa S.A.B. de C.V. Pcm, Inc. Ubisoft Entertainment SA 
China South Publishing & Media 
Group Company Limited 
GS Home Shopping Inc. Pearson PLC Verint Systems, Inc. 
Chinasoft International Limited HCL Technologies Limited Pivot Technology Solutions, Inc. Verisign INC 
Cimpress N.V. Henan Dayou Energy Co., Ltd. Playtech PLC Verisk Analytics, Inc. 
CIR S.P.A. - Compagnie Industriali 
Riunite Siglabile CIR S.P.A. 
Henry Jack & Associates INC Presidio, Inc. Viacom, Inc. 
Citrix Systems INC Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 
Company 
Prosiebensat.1 Media SE Vipshop Holdings LTD 
CJ ENM CO. Ltd. Iliad Quebecor INC Virtusa Corporation 
Cofide - Gruppo de Benedetti S.P.A. Indra Sistemas SA Qurate Retail, Inc. Vmware, Inc. 
Cognizant Technology Solutions 
Corp 
Informa PLC Rakuten INC Wayfair Inc. 
Comcast Corporation Infosys Limited RED HAT INC Weibo Corporation 
Computacenter PLC Insight Enterprises INC Redington (India) Ltd. Wipro Limited 
Conexio Corporation Internet Initiative Japan INC Relx PLC Wirecard AG 
Constellation Software Inc. Itochu Techno-Solutions 
Corporation 
Reply S.P.A. Wolters Kluwer NV 
Convergys Corp Jd.Com Incorporated Rizap Group, Inc. Workday, Inc. 
Copart INC Jiangsu Phoenix Publishing & 
Media Corporation Limited 
Rizzoli Corriere Della Sera 
Mediagroup S.P.A. 
Worldline 
CoreLogic Inc. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. RTL Group SA Xinhua Winshare Publishing and 
Media Co., Ltd. 
Criteo SA Kadokawa Dwango Corporation S&P Global Inc. Yandex N.V. 
Cyberagent INC Konami Holdings Corporation Sabre Corporation Yirendai Ltd. 
DAI Nippon Printing CO LTD Lagardere SCA Salesforce.Com, Inc. Yonyou Network Technology Co., 
Ltd. 
Daily Mail and General Trust PLC Larsen & Toubro Infotech Limited Samsung SDS Co.,Ltd. YY Inc. 
Daou Tech Inc. Leidos Holdings, Inc. Sanoma OYJ Zalando SE 
Dassault Systemes SE Liberty Expedia Holdings, Inc. Schibsted ASA Zozo, Inc. 
Datatec Limited Liberty Global PLC Scholastic Corp 
 
DHC Software Co., Ltd. Liberty Tripadvisor Holdings, Inc. Science Applications International 
Corp 
 
Notes: In total 222 companies are classified to be affected by the EU draft directives.  
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Table 4 Descriptive statistics  
Variable N Mean SD P25 Median P75 Min Max 
Stock return 53,724 0.08 1.69 -0.72 0 0.87 -5.87 6.17 
Market return (S&P 1200) 53,724 0.05 0.57 -0.15 0.07 0.33 -4.07 1.61 
Cash ETR 42,350 25.63 12.29 18.37 25.62 31.66 0.06 85.71 
Intangible to total assets 53,482 31.67 23.97 9.05 29 49.96 0 89.46 
EU revenue/total revenue 50,820 46.25 39.05 1.54 46.71 85.15 0 100 
Revenues in billion euro 53,724 6.15 14.6 1.32 2.35 5.1 0.66 148.31 
Loss-making (2017) 53,724 0.09 0.29 0 0 0 0 1 
Notes: Treated firms are listed firms with consolidated annual turnover above 750 euro million that are classified 
to be affected by the digital tax proposals. All values, except for the number of firms N and revenues, are stated 
in percent. 
 
 
Table 5 Dispersion of treated firms over countries 
 
 
 
Country Frequency Percent 
Australia 2 0.90 
Belgium 1 0.45 
Bermuda 2 0.90 
Canada 5 2.25 
Cayman Islands 12 5.41 
Chile 1 0.45 
China 8 3.60 
Finland 1 0.45 
France 11 4.95 
Germany 7 3.15 
India 8 3.60 
Israel 2 0.90 
Italy 7 3.15 
Japan 28 12.61 
Korea (Republic of) 7 3.15 
Luxembourg 1 0.45 
Mexico 1 0.45 
Netherlands 5 2.25 
Norway 1 0.45 
Poland 1 0.45 
South Africa 3 1.35 
Spain 3 1.35 
Sweden 2 0.90 
United Kingdom 15 6.76 
United States of America 88 39.64  
Notes: Treated firms are stock-listed firms whose global consolidated revenue exceeds 750 million euro and the 
firms operate in an industry that is likely to be affected by the EU digital tax proposal.  The relevant NACE Rev. 
2 codes are: 6201, 6209, 6311, 6312, 4791 and 5811 to 5819. In total, we have 222 treated firms in our main 
sample. The country of origin is the location where the firm is incorporated. 
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Table 6 Cumulative average abnormal return – baseline result 
 (1) 
 Stock return 
Alpha 0.044** 
 (0.019) 
Market return (S&P 1200) 0.715*** 
 (0.048) 
21-22 Mar. 2018 -0.692*** 
 (0.070) 
Observations 53,724 
Standard errors clustered on firm level Yes 
Standard errors clustered on trading days Yes 
Firms 222 
Adj.-R2 0.063 
Notes: The Table presents the results of the conditional market model: 𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝐷𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 . 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the 
return of firm i on day t that is likely to fall under the scope of the digital tax proposal (group of treated firms), 𝑅𝑚𝑡 
is the return of the market index m (S&P Global 1200) on day t. 𝐷𝑡  is a dummy set equal to 1 in the two-day event 
window, and 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is an error term. 𝛼𝑖 provides an estimate for the alpha of an equally-weighted portfolio of all 222 
treated firms and 𝛽𝑖 is the estimate of the portfolio’s market beta. The coefficient estimate of 𝛾𝑖 (and the 
corresponding standard error) is multiplied by two to account for the length of the two-day event window (Eckbo 
et al. 2007). 𝛾𝑖 can thus be interpreted as an estimate for the cumulative average abnormal return CAAR over the 
two-day event window. The model is estimated using returns of 250 trading days before the event date, excluding 
the ten trading days immediately prior to the event date. 
Clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively.  
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Table 7 Cross-sectional analysis – tax aggressiveness 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Stock return Stock return Stock return Stock return 
Alpha 0.047** 0.044** 0.044** 0.046** 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.019) (0.021) 
Market return (S&P 1200) 0.676*** 0.676*** 0.714*** 0.714*** 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.048) (0.048) 
21-22 Mar. 2018 -0.679*** -0.605*** -0.692*** -0.584*** 
 (0.166) (0.153) (0.078) (0.123) 
Tax aggressiveness 0.001    
 (0.001)    
Tax aggressiveness x 21-22 Mar. 2018 -0.021***    
 (0.006)    
Tax aggressiveness: highest quintile=1  0.017   
  (0.030)   
Tax aggressiveness: highest quintile=1 x 21-22 Mar. 2018  -0.485***   
  (0.173)   
Intangible to total assets   -0.001  
   (0.001)  
Intangible to total assets x 21-22 Mar. 2018   -0.009  
   (0.010)  
Intangible to total assets: highest quintile=1    -0.008 
    (0.024) 
Intangible to total assets: highest quintile=1 x 21-22 Mar. 2018    -0.548 
    (0.347) 
Observations 42,350 42,350 53,482 53,482 
Standard errors clustered on firm level Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard errors clustered on trading days Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firms 175 175 221 221 
Adj.-R2 0.060 0.060 0.062 0.062 
Notes: The Table presents the results of the conditional market model: 𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝐷𝑡 + 𝜌𝑖𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖 + 𝛿𝑖𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝐷𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡. 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the return of firm i on day t that is likely to 
fall under the scope of the digital tax proposal (group of treated firms), 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the return of the market index m (S&P Global 1200) on day t, 𝐷𝑡  is a dummy set equal to 1 in the 
two-day event window, and 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is an error term. 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖 is an estimate for the tax aggressiveness or the profit shifting potential of a firm. First, Tax aggressiveness is measured as 
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Table 7 Cross-sectional analysis – tax aggressiveness 
the negative of a firm’s effective tax rate (ETR). Firms with negative ETRs are excluded from the sample. The negative conversion allows for an intuitive interpretation of the 
coefficient 𝛿𝑖 on the two-day CAAR. The Tax aggressiveness variable is centered on the mean. Tax aggressiveness: highest quintile is a dummy variable with the value of one 
for all firms who’s ETR is in the lowest 20 percentile. Profit shifting potential is measured as the ratio of intangible to total assets. Profit shifting potential: highest quintile is a 
dummy variable equal to one for all firms who’s intangible to total assets ratio is in the highest quintile. Coefficients can be interpreted as in Table 6. In addition, 𝜌𝑖 measures 
the effect of the firm-specific indicator on the stock return, respectively. 𝛿𝑖 is an estimate of the effect of the firm-specific indicator on the two-day CAAR. The model is estimated 
using returns of 250 trading days before the event date, excluding the ten trading days immediately prior to the event date. 
Clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 8 Cross-sectional variation – firm-specific characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Stock return Stock return Stock return Stock return 
Alpha 0.040 0.036* 0.043** 0.043** 
 (0.026) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) 
Market return (S&P 1200) 0.703*** 0.703*** 0.715*** 0.715*** 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
21-22 Mar. 2018 -0.071 -0.387*** -0.668*** -0.619*** 
 (0.344) (0.136) (0.080) (0.188) 
EU exposure 0.000    
 (0.000)    
EU exposure x 21-22 Mar. 2018 -0.012**    
 (0.006)    
EU exposure: highest quintile=1  0.033   
  (0.027)   
EU exposure: highest quintile=1 x 21-22 Mar. 2018  -1.158***   
  (0.264)   
Revenues   0.000  
   (0.000)  
Revenues x 21-22 Mar. 2018   -0.012**  
   (0.005)  
Loss-making (2017)=1    0.015 
    (0.039) 
Loss-making (2017)=1 x 21-22 Mar. 2018    -0.770 
    (1.348) 
Observations 50,820 50,820 53,724 53,724 
Standard errors clustered on firm level Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard errors clustered on trading days Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firms 210 210 222 222 
Adj.-R2 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 
Notes: The Table presents the results of the conditional market model: 𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝐷𝑡 + 𝜌𝑖𝐼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑖𝐼𝑖𝐷𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 . 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the return of firm i on day t that is likely to fall under 
the scope of the digital tax proposal (group of treated firms), 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the return of the market index m (S&P Global 1200) on day t, 𝐷𝑡  is a dummy set equal to 1 in the two-day 
event window, and 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is an error term. 𝐼𝑖  is an indicator for firm-specific characteristics. First, EU exposure is measured as the ratio of revenues by subsidiaries located in the EU 
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Table 8 Cross-sectional variation – firm-specific characteristics 
to overall revenue of all the firm’s subsidiaries. Second, EU exposure: highest quintile is a dummy variable with the value of one for firms with a ratio of EU subsiaries’ revenues 
to total revenue in the highest 20 percentile. Third, Revenues measures a firm’s consolidated revenues. The variable is centered on the mean. Forth, Loss-making is a dummy 
variable indicating firms with losses in the financial year 2017. Coefficients can be interpreted as in Table 6. In addition, 𝜌𝑖 measures the effect of the firm-specific indicator on 
the stock return, respectively. 𝛿𝑖 is an estimate of the effect of the firm-specific indicator on the two-day CAAR. The model is estimated using returns of 250 trading days before 
the event date, excluding the ten trading days immediately prior to the event date. 
Clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 9 Difference in differences regression 
 (1) 
 Stock return 
Alpha 0.055** 
 (0.027) 
Market return (S&P 1200) 0.628*** 
 (0.047) 
21-22 Mar. 2018 0.122 
 (0.390) 
Treated firms=1 -0.004 
 (0.021) 
Treated firms=1 x 21-22 Mar. 2018 -0.978** 
 (0.471) 
Observations 83,490 
Standard errors clustered on firm level Yes 
Standard errors clustered on trading days Yes 
Firms 345 
Adj.-R2 0.042 
Notes: The Table presents the results of the conditional market model: 𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝐷𝑡 + 𝜌𝑖𝑇𝑖 +
𝛿𝑖𝐷𝑡𝑇𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡. 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the return of firm i on day t. 𝑇𝑖  is a dummy variable set equal to 1 for firms that are likely to 
fall under the scope of the digital tax proposal (group of treated firms), 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the return of the market index m 
(S&P Global 1200) on day t. 𝐷𝑡  is a dummy set equal to 1 in the two-day event window, and 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is an error term. 
𝛼𝑖 provides an estimate for the alpha of an equally-weighted portfolio of all 222 treated firms and 𝛽𝑖 is the estimate 
of the portfolio’s market beta. Coefficients can be interpreted as in Table 6. In addition, 𝜌𝑖 measures if the alpha 
of the control firm portfolio differs from the treated firm portfolio. 𝛿𝑖 is an estimate of the difference of the two-
day CAAR between treated and control firms. The model is estimated using returns of 250 trading days before the 
event date, excluding the ten trading days immediately prior to the event date. 
Clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. 
 
 
Table 10 Change in market value – two-day window starting on event date 
 
  (1) (2) 
average abnormal 
return based on 
firm-specific market model approach firm-specific using control group as 
expected return 
21-22 Mar 2018 -52,854 -85,394 
Notes: Column (1) and (2) use firm-specific estimates to calculate the abnormal market value change. Column (1) 
uses the market value approach and column (2) estimates the abnormal return as the difference between actual 
return and average return of comparable non-affected firms. For both expected return estimation approach, the 
abnormal return is calculated at the level of each of the 222 treated stock-listed firms whose global consolidated 
revenue exceed 750 million euro and that are, based on their industry affiliation, likely affected by the EU digital 
tax proposal. Firms’ market values are taken from EIKON in the local currency and converted to euro with the 
applicable exchange rate. Based on the individual abnormal return calculation, the market value changes are 
estimated over a two-day period, starting on the event date March 21, 2018. The combined market value change 
of all 222 affected firms represents the overall effect.  
Market value changes are depicted in millions of euro.  
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ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
 
Table 11 Alternative event dates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Stock return Stock return Stock return Stock return 
Alpha 0.038* 0.045* 0.012 0.028 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.023) (0.023) 
Market return (S&P 1200) 0.732*** 0.718*** 0.787*** 0.909*** 
 (0.054) (0.050) (0.047) (0.044) 
26-27 Feb. 2018 -0.148    
 (0.670)    
15-16 Mar. 2018  -0.300   
  (0.285)   
4-5 Dec. 2018   -0.017  
   (0.230)  
12-13 Mar. 2019    -1.275*** 
    (0.046) 
Observations 53,692 53,716 52,734 52,320 
Standard errors clustered on firm level Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard errors clustered on trading days Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firms 222 222 222 222 
Adj.-R2 0.058 0.057 0.102 0.120 
Notes: The Table presents the results of the conditional market model: 𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝐷𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 . 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is 
the return of firm i on day t that is likely to fall under the scope of the digital tax proposal (group of treated 
firms), 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the return of the market index m (S&P Global 1200) on day t. 𝐷𝑡  is a dummy set equal to 1 in the 
two-day event window, and 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is an error term. 𝛼𝑖 provides an estimate for the alpha of an equally-weighted 
portfolio of all 222 treated firms and 𝛽𝑖 is the estimate of the portfolio’s market beta. The coefficient estimate 
of 𝛾𝑖 (and the corresponding standard error) is multiplied by two to account for the length of the two-day event 
window (Eckbo et al. 2007). 𝛾𝑖 can thus be interpreted as an estimate for the cumulative average abnormal return 
CAAR over the two-day event window. The model is estimated using returns of 250 trading days before the event 
date, excluding the ten trading days immediately prior to the event date. 
Clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level, respectively. 
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Table 12 Cumulative average abnormal returns – alternative event study method 
 
 
Table 13 Value-weighted portfolio 
 (1) 
 Stock return 
Alpha 0.036** 
 (0.016) 
Market return (S&P 1200) 0.473*** 
 (0.125) 
21-22 Mar. 2018 -0.590*** 
 (0.159) 
Observations 53,724 
Standard errors clustered on firm level Yes 
Standard errors clustered on trading days Yes 
Firms 222 
Adj.-R2 0.016 
Notes: The Table presents the results of the conditional market model: 𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝐷𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 . 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the 
value-weighted return of firm i on day t that is likely to fall under the scope of the digital tax proposal (group of 
treated firms), 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the return of the market index m (S&P Global 1200) on day t. 𝐷𝑡  is a dummy set equal to 1 
in the two-day event window, and 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is an error term. 𝛼𝑖 provides an estimate for the alpha of an equally-weighted 
portfolio of all 222 treated firms and 𝛽𝑖 is the estimate of the portfolio’s market beta. The coefficient estimate of 
𝛾𝑖 (and the corresponding standard error) is multiplied by two to account for the length of the two-day event 
window (Eckbo et al. 2007). 𝛾𝑖 can thus be interpreted as an estimate for the cumulative average abnormal return 
CAAR over the two-day event window. The model is estimated using returns of 250 trading days before the event 
date, excluding the ten trading days immediately prior to the event date. 
Clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively.  
 
 
  (1) (2) 
Expected return 
estimation 
market model using control group as expected return 
21-22 Mar. 2018 -0.690* -0.986** 
(0.417) (0.436) 
Notes: This model estimates the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) in line with Kothari and Warner 
(2007). 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝑡0, 𝑡1) = ∑ (
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑖=𝑁
𝑖=1 )
𝑡=𝑡1
𝑡=𝑡0
. Daily abnormal returns 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡  are calculated as the difference between 
actual returns and expected returns 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑒𝑥𝑝
. We use two alternatives to estimate 𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑒𝑥𝑝
. First, we use 
parameters from the market model regression for each individual firm to estimate the expected return:  
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − (?̂?𝑖 + ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡). Second, we take the average return of a control group, firms operating in the similar 
industries but below the revenue size threshold, as the expected return: 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 −
1
𝑁𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟
∑ 𝑅𝑗𝑡
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑁𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟
𝑗=𝑛 .  The 
ratio of the CAAR and its estimated standard deviation (?̂?) provides – in the absence of abnormal returns – a 
normally distributed test statistic. The 222 treated firms are stock-listed firms whose global consolidated revenue 
exceeds 750 million euro and the firms operate in an industry that is likely to be affected by the EU digital tax 
proposal.  
Standard errors are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively.   
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Table 14 Daily abnormal returns 
 (1) 
 Stock return 
Alpha 0.044** 
 (0.019) 
Market return (S&P 1200) 0.716*** 
 (0.049) 
19 Mar. 2018 -0.420*** 
 (0.066) 
20 Mar. 2018 0.167*** 
 (0.039) 
21 Mar. 2018 -0.380*** 
 (0.044) 
22 Mar. 2018 -0.310*** 
 (0.064) 
23 Mar. 2018 -0.389*** 
 (0.105) 
Observations 54,390 
Standard errors clustered on firm level Yes 
Standard errors clustered on trading days Yes 
Firms 222 
Adj.-R2 0.068 
Notes: The Table presents the results of the conditional market model: 𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑑𝑖𝐷𝑑𝑡
𝑑=2
𝑑=−2 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 . 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the return of firm i on day t that is likely to fall under the scope of the digital tax proposal (group of treated 
firms), 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the return of the market index m (S&P Global 1200) on day t. 𝐷𝑑𝑡  is a dummy set equal to 1 on the 
respective day, and 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is an error term. 𝛼𝑖 provides an estimate for the alpha of an equally-weighted portfolio of 
all 222 treated firms and 𝛽𝑖 is the estimate of the portfolio’s market beta. The coefficient estimate of 𝛾𝑖can be 
interpreted as the daily abnormal return. The model is estimated using returns of 250 trading days before the 
event date, excluding the ten trading days immediately prior to the event date. 
Clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. 
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Table 15 Alternative event window length 
 (1) 
 Stock return 
Alpha 0.044** 
 (0.019) 
Market return (S&P 1200) 0.718*** 
 (0.049) 
20-22 Mar. 2018 -0.517 
 (0.418) 
Observations 53,946 
Standard errors clustered on firm level Yes 
Standard errors clustered on trading days Yes 
Firms 222 
Adj.-R2 0.062 
Notes: The Table presents the results of the conditional market model: 𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝐷𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 . 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is 
the return of firm i on day t that is likely to fall under the scope of the digital tax proposal (group of treated 
firms), 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the return of the market index m (S&P Global 1200) on day t, 𝐷𝑡  is a dummy set equal to 1 in the 
two-day event window, and 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is an error term. 𝛼𝑖 provides an estimate for the alpha of an equally-weighted 
portfolio of all 222 treated firms and 𝛽𝑖 is the estimate of the portfolio’s market beta. The coefficient estimate 
of 𝛾𝑖 (and the corresponding standard error) is multiplied by three to account for the length of the three-day 
event window (Eckbo et al. 2007). 𝛾𝑖 can thus be interpreted as an estimate for the cumulative average abnormal 
return CAAR over the three-day event window. The model is estimated using returns of 250 trading days before 
the event date, excluding the ten trading days immediately prior to the event date. 
Clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level, respectively. 
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Table 16 Alternative test statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  (1) (2) 
Expected return estimation Market model Average return of  
control group 
Panel A: Additional parametric test statistics 
21-22 Mar 2018 -0.690 -0.986 
  
   
Parametric test alternative (-1.809)* (-2.313)** 
Corrado rank-sum test (-2.438)* (-1.861)* 
Panel B: Frequency of negative abnormal returns 
Treatment group 
Abnormal return<0 (N) 144  
Abnormal return≥0 (N) 78  
Percent<0 64.9%  
Control group 
Abnormal return<0 (N) 63  
Abnormal return≥0 (N) 60  
Percent<0 51.2%  
   
Pearson's chi square 
Statistic (1 DOF) 
6.140  
P-value (One-Tail) 0.013  
Notes: The 222 treated firms are stock-listed firms whose global consolidated revenue exceeds 750 million euro 
and the firms operate in an industry that is likely to be affected by the EU digital tax proposal. Panel A depicts 
additional parametric and non-parametric test statistics for the main results. The parametric test alternative is based 
on Kothari and Warner (2007) and is calculated as 𝑡𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐 2 =
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(0,1)
√𝑠2(𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝑑))
, with 𝑠2(𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝑑)) as the variance 
of cumulated average abnormal two-day returns in the estimation period. The Corrado rank-sum test is calculated 
as 𝑧𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘 =
 ∑  
1
242
∑ (𝑘𝑖,𝑡−𝐸(𝑘))
242
𝑖=1
𝑡=1
𝑡=0
√𝑑×𝑠2(𝑘)
, with 𝐾𝑖,𝑡 denoting the rank of the abnormal return of firm 𝑖 at day 𝑡 in the time 
series. The expected rank 𝐸(𝑘) is one-half plus half the number of time-series days and d is the number of days. 
The test statistic is assumed to be distributed asymptotic standard normal. Panel B depicts the absolute number and 
frequency of negative (and positive) abnormal returns for the treatment and control group, for both different 
expected return estimation method, excluding the control group. 
Test statistics are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively.   
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Table 17 Robustness results – non-winsorized returns 
 (1) 
 Stock return 
Alpha 0.048** 
 (0.021) 
Market return (S&P 1200) 0.739*** 
 (0.052) 
21-22 Mar. 2018 -0.740*** 
 (0.064) 
Observations 53,724 
Standard errors clustered on firm level Yes 
Standard errors clustered on trading days Yes 
Firms 222 
Adj.-R2 0.048 
Notes: The Table presents the results of the conditional market model: 𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝐷𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 . 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the 
non-winsorized return of firm i on day t that is likely to fall under the scope of the digital tax proposal (group of 
treated firms), 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the return of the market index m (S&P Global 1200) on day t. 𝐷𝑡  is a dummy set equal to 1 
in the two-day event window, and 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is an error term. 𝛼𝑖 provides an estimate for the alpha of an equally-weighted 
portfolio of all 222 treated firms and 𝛽𝑖 is the estimate of the portfolio’s market beta. The coefficient estimate of 
𝛾𝑖 (and the corresponding standard error) is multiplied by two to account for the length of the two-day event 
window (Eckbo et al. 2007). 𝛾𝑖 can thus be interpreted as an estimate for the cumulative average abnormal return 
CAAR over the two-day event window. The model is estimated using returns of 250 trading days before the event 
date, excluding the ten trading days immediately prior to the event date. 
Clustered standard errors are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively.  
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